Article delegate-en/702 of [1-5169] on the server localhost:119
  upper oldest olders older1 this newer1 newers latest
search
[Top/Up] [oldest] - [Older+chunk] - [Newer+chunk] - [newest + Check]

Newsgroups: mail-lists.delegate-en

[DeleGate-En] DeleGate Security Advisory - Buffer Overflows
22 Feb 2000 05:28:26 GMT "J. Francois" <ppubabdyi-gztnjk7qfbnr.ml@ml.delegate.org>
MagusNet, Inc. Design * Develop * Integrate


Does this mean I have to shut down my Public Proxy?
Are these issues being addressed in 6.1?

====================================================

http://linuxtoday.com/story.php3?sn=17089

====================================================

   Date: Sat, 19 Feb 2000 22:50:34 -0800
   From: Kris Kennaway kris@FREEBSD..
   To: BUGTRAQ@SECURITYFOCUS..
   Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory: FreeBSD-SA-00:04.delegate
     _________________________________________________________________
   
   FreeBSD-SA-00:04 Security Advisory FreeBSD, Inc.
   
   Topic: Delegate port contains numerous buffer overflows
   
   Category: ports
   Module: delegate
   Announced: 2000-02-19
   Affects: Ports collection before the correction date.
   Corrected: 2000-02-02
   FreeBSD only: NO
   
   I. Background
   
   An optional third-party port distributed with FreeBSD contains
   numerous remotely-exploitable buffer overflows which allow an attacker
   to execute arbitrary commands on the local system, typically as the
   'nobody' user.
   
   II. Problem Description
   
   Delegate is a versatile application-level proxy. Unfortunately it is
   written in a very insecure style, with potentially dozens of different
   exploitable buffer overflows (including several demonstrated ones),
   each of which could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the
   delegate server. This code will run as the user ID of the 'delegated'
   process, typically 'nobody' in the recommended configuration, but this
   still represents a security risk as the attacker may be able to mount
   a local attack to further upgrade his or her access privileges.
   
   Note that the delegate utility is not installed by default, nor is it
   "part of FreeBSD" as such: it is part of the FreeBSD ports collection,
   which contains over 3100 third-party applications in a
   ready-to-install format.
   
   FreeBSD makes no claim about the security of these third-party
   applications, although an effort is underway to provide a security
   audit of the most security-critical ports.
   
   III. Impact
   
   If you have not chosen to install the delegate port/package, then your
   system is not vulnerable. If you have, then local or remote users who
   can connect to the delegate port(s), or malicious servers which a user
   accesses using the delegate proxy, can potentially execute arbitrary
   code on your system in any number of ways.
   
   IV. Workaround
   
   Remove the delegate port/package, if you have installed it.
   
   V. Solution
   
   Unfortunately no simple fix is available - the problems with the
   delegate software are too endemic to be fixed by a simple patch. It is
   hoped the software authors will take security to heart and correct the
   security problems in a future version, although user caution is
   advised given the current state of the code.
   
   Depending on your local setup and your security threat model, using a
   firewall/packet filter such as ipfw(8) or ipf(8) to prevent remote
   users from connecting to the delegate port(s) may be enough to meet
   your security needs. Note that this will not prevent legitimate proxy
   users from attacking the delegate server, although this may not be an
   issue if they have a shell account on the machine anyway.
   
   Note also that this does not prevent "passive" exploits in which a
   user is convinced through other means into visiting a malicious server
   using the proxy, which may be able to compromise it by sending back
   invalid data. Several flaws of this type have been discovered during a
   brief survey of the code.
   
   If you are running FreeBSD 4.0, a possible solution might be to
   confine the delegate process inside a "jail" (see the jail(8)
   manpage). A properly configured jail will isolate the contents in
   their own separate "virtual machine", which can be suitably secured so
   that an attacker who gains control of a process running inside the
   jail cannot escape and gain access to the rest of the machine. Note
   that this is different from a traditional
   chroot(8), since it does not just attempt to isolate processes inside
   portions of the filesystem. This solution is not possible under
   standard FreeBSD 3.x or earlier.



  admin search upper oldest olders older1 this newer1 newers latest
[Top/Up] [oldest] - [Older+chunk] - [Newer+chunk] - [newest + Check]
@_@V